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HOURYA SINACEUR  
ALFRED TARSKI: SEMANTIC SHIFT, HEURISTIC SHIFT IN 
METAMATHEMATICS  
Metamathematics was created by Hilbert in a series of papers published 
between 1905 and 1931. Hilbert used the term ‘metamathematics’ for the first 
time in 1922 as synonymous with ‘proof theory’ (Beweistheorie). The idea, 
but not the term, of proof theory was already present in his 1905 paper and 
described in more detail in 1918. In the latter paper, Hilbert outlined a 
programme for opening a new branch of mathematical inquiry, namely the 
study of the concept of mathematical proof. He listed some problems in the 
“theory of [mathematical] knowledge” which, he believed, could be solved 
within the framework of this “new mathematics”: first of all, the problem of 
the consistency of arithmetic, and also the questions of the solvability of every 
mathematical problem, of decidability by a finite number of steps, of checking 
results, of defining a criterion for testing the simplicity of mathematical proofs, 
and finally the question of determining the relations between content and 
formalism (Inhaltlichkeit und Formalismus)in mathematics and logic.
1 
As 
Hilbert explicitly required in the case of the consistency of elementary 
arithmetic, the solution must be a mathematical one.
2 
Thus, metamathematics 
consists in the use of mathematical tools to study logical or epistemological 
questions concerning mathematical structures or methods. Hilbert had such a 
definition in mind and this definition still suited the work of Hilbert’s 
followers, namely, Gödel, Tarski, Church, Kleene or Kreisel (among others). 
One needs only to add that the meaning of ‘mathematical tools’ may be so 
wide as to include logical ingredients, since logic itself became in the 
meantime, and thanks precisely to the work of the above mentioned logicians 
and some others, much more involved in other mathematical branches.  
With his proof theory, Hilbert created one of the three fundamental trends of 
metamathematical research which, along with recursion theory and model 
theory, nowadays constitute the scope of mathematical logic. I shall not look 
at recursion theory here. Rather, I will examine how Tarski developed 
Hilbertian metamathematics in order to create the basis of a new domain of 
mathematical logic, i.e., model theory.  
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1. TARSKIAN METAMATHEMATICS
Tarski knew very well the results and methods of what he himself
named the “Göttingen School” of logic.3 As we can see by reading his
early writings, he used the expression “methodology of deductive sci-
ences” to refer to his own work, borrowing this expression from K.
Ajdukiewicz and stressing that it is synonymous with the Hilbertian term
“metamathematics”.4 On his part, he defined the methodology of deductive
sciences, or “methodology of mathematics”, as the study of “formal-
ized deductive theories” such as Peano’s arithmetic or Hilbert’s axiomatic
geometry.5 However, he soon came to dislike the term ‘methodology’, the
meaning of which did not fit his current ideas:6 Tarski wanted neither
to develop “the science of method” nor to apply logic to philosophy.
He emphasized indeed that “the analysis and the critical evaluation of
the methods, which are applied in the construction of deductive sciences
ceased to be the exclusive, or even the main task of methodology”.7 Eager
to apply mathematics to logic and conversely logic to mathematics, he ad-
opted the Hilbertian term from 1935 onwards.8 He stressed however that
the expression ‘proof theory’ seemed to him not to be very good and in
any case less appropriate than ‘metamathematics’.9 Moreover, he strove
to construct for the latter a meaning which no longer coincided with the
Hilbertian one. If Hilbert grosso modo identified metamathematics with
proof theory, Tarski needed to widen the scope of metamathematics in
order to make it fit his own ideas and work. For him, the issue at stake was
not only mathematical proof, but the whole field consisting of logic and
mathematics – mathematics as generally practised by the working math-
ematician. This is one reason why Tarski more particularly rejected the
restriction to “finitistic methods”, i.e., methods for solving mathematical
problems in a finite number of steps and with no appeal to the so-called
“actual infinite”.
In fact, after Gödel’s results on the incompleteness of any first-order
theory incorporating number theory (1931), metamathematical investiga-
tions could no longer be centered on Hilbert’s main problem as formulated
between 1904 and 1930, namely the consistency of elementary arithmetic,
which was thought of as the foundational problem in mathematics. Among
other Hilbertian metamathematical problems, the decidability of the first-
order theory of quantification, viewed as the fundamental problem for
symbolic logic, and the solvability of every mathematical question were
the dominant concerns for logicians in the late 1920s. About both issues
there were, however, strong misgivings.10 As for the problem of the re-
lations between a formal system and its content, it was Tarski who gave
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a radically new outlook, developing an original back-and-forth method
between a formal language ant its interpretations and obtaining very im-
portant results by means of this method. One can say that developing this
method, – which was going to be specific to model theory – was Tarski’s
own way of dealing with the Hilbertian problem of exploring the relations
between content and formalism.
How did Tarski come to his views? What did he aim for in his own
metamathematical investigations?
1.1. A General Theory of Deductive Science
As early as 1930, Tarski observed that “strictly speaking, metamathem-
atics is not to be regarded as a single theory. For the purpose of in-
vestigating each deductive discipline a special metadiscipline should be
constructed”.11 This observation means that there is no universal meta-
theory for the whole field of mathematics. In Tarski’s view, it is possible,
however, to construct the domain of “general metamathematics”, whose
task is to define the meaning of a series of metamathematical concepts
which are common to the special metadisciplines, and to establish the basic
properties of these concepts. Among these concepts we find consistency,
completeness, decidability and also satisfiability and truth of a formula,12
definability,13 model, consequence,14 theory,15 etc. all of whose definitions
the model theorists today mainly owe to Tarski. It was this precise defin-
ition of semantic concepts used informally by some great logicians who
preceded him – such as Skolem or Gödel –, which constituted a crucial
shift in metamathematics. Let me give one single example. Gödel used the
term ‘model’ in the Introduction of his paper on ‘The completeness of the
calculus of logic’ (1929).16 As far as I know, this was the first occurrence
of the term, but Gödel did not define it. In German the usual words were
‘Realisierung’, ‘Erfüllbarkeit’ or ‘Erfüllung’. Hilbert, for instance, used to
speak of the ‘Erfüllbarkeit’ or ‘Erfüllung eines Axiomensystems’. Before
1935 he used the term ‘model’ only once, namely, in Hilbert and Bernays
(1934, 18). On his part, Skolem generally used the periphrases “domain
(Bereich), in which such proposition is satisfied (erfüllt)” or “set of ele-
ments in which such axioms are true”. Skolem used the term ‘modèle’ (in
French) with nearly the same meaning as the German “Erfüllbarkeit”, in
a single paper, read at the Entretiens de Zürich, in 1938.17 At that time
Tarski had already defined the concept of model in terms of the concept
of satisfaction in his address at the International Congress of Scientific
Philosophy in Paris (1936d).18 He had stressed that the given definition
coincides with the mathematical use of the word19 and he had stated the
definition of logical consequence which has become classic:
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The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K iff every model of the
class K is also a model of the sentence X.
In chapter VI, paragraph 37 of his Introduction to Logic and to
the Methodology of Deductive Sciences (1936b), Tarski had thoroughly
explained the concept of model through the very simple example of con-
gruent segments; he had specified that an axiomatic system can have
several models and the way in which a theory can have a model in another
theory.
In 1944 Tarski himself praised the merits of his semantical method: it
allowed him to adequately define concepts which had been used until then
only in an intuitive way.20
Thus, Tarski achieved a very specific semantic shift from a view which
focused on formal systems, axioms and rules of proof, to a view focused:
(1) on the formal definition and the axiomatization of semantic concepts,
and (2) on the interplay between sets of elementary sentences and their
mathematical models. In the model-theoretic tradition, which goes back
to J. Lambert21 in mathematics and to Ch. S. Peirce and E. Schröder in
logic,22 the relation of a sentence (or a set of sentences) to its models
is the main concern. Tarski’s specific contribution consisted in exploring
the mutual relations between sentences and their mathematical models, in
showing that semantic analysis is furthered, and not superseded, by syn-
tactic analysis and in weaving metamathematical and mathematical threads
in a much tighter fashion than anyone had done before him.
In a footnote to the last sentence of paragraph 42 of Tarski (1936b),
Tarski dated the beginning of his general metamathematics to around
1920, and attributed it equally to the Göttingen School (with Hilbert and
Bernays) and to the Warsaw School (with Les´niewski and Lukasiewicz
among others). The originality and significance of his personal work,
which may be rightly characterized as axiomatic semantics,23 soon became
evident to logicians. For instance, Rudolph Carnap stated in his Introduc-
tion to Semantics (1942) that it was Tarski who “first called my attention
to the fact that the formal method of syntax must be supplemented by
semantical concepts that can be defined by means no less exact than those
of syntax”.24 About forty years later Jon Barwise declared that ‘Tarski’s
view of logic has changed the way all of us think about the subject”.25
1.2. Examples of Tarski’s Way of Defining a Concept and Solving a
Problem
Tarski fruitfully developed a specific kind of conceptual analysis. He
combined the syntactic analysis inherited from Hilbert’s School and the
semantic methods of the algebraists of logic (Peirce, Schröder, Löwen-
ALFRED TARSKI: SEMANTIC SHIFT, HEURISTIC SHIFT IN METAMATHEMATICS 53
heim, and Skolem). From Les´niewski – his dissertation adviser whose
direct influence he acknowledged26 – Tarski learned that any formalized
theory consists of meaningful sentences.27 Tarski’s semantics did reorient
syntactic analysis; it did not reject it. Thus, attention was focused on the
interrelations between formal sentences and their possible meaning (i.e.,
their possible interpretations) in some mathematical domain, and the aim
was to define semantic concepts as well as solve metamathematical prob-
lems mathematically. Let me give two examples of Tarski’s conceptual
analysis, which is at the same time synctactical and semantical.
1.2.1. In Tarski’s view, no precise definition could be constructed in a
completely abstract and general way. Tarski did not address such general
questions as “What is a number?” – a major question for Frege – or “What
is a set?” – a question which was much discussed since Dedekind’s and
Cantor’s work on set theory –. In fact, Tarski did not expect a uniform and
unambiguous answer to these kinds of questions. He thought, rather, that
the answer to a question or, at least, to one of its aspects, depended on the
presupposed framework and tools used to formulate precisely that question
or its selected aspect. Even when he came to address the question ‘What
are logical notions?’ in a lecture given in 1966 and published twenty years
later, he stressed that he was not aiming to discuss “the general question
‘What is logic?’ ” but wanted instead to restrict his comments to “one as-
pect of the problem, the problem of logical notions”. Moreover, he pointed
out how much his approach distances itself from attempts to catch “the
proper, true meaning of a notion, something independent of actual usage,
and independent of any normative proposals, something like the platonic
idea behind the notion”. On his part, he would “make a suggestion or
proposal about a possible use of the term ‘logical notion’ ”.28 Thus, Tarski
constructed an algebraic definition for this term: a notion is logical if it is
invariant under all possible one-one transformations of the universe of dis-
course onto itself. Then, he concluded: “The suggestion I have made does
not, by itself, imply any answer to the question of whether mathematical
notions are logical”. According to Tarski, the latter question has a positive
answer if one takes a higher-order underlying logic (e.g., as in Principia
mathematica of Russell and Whitehead), and a negative answer if one takes
a first-order underlying logic. Thus, the logicist philosophy of Frege and
Russell was in fact closely tied to the logical framework they had adopted.
Another framework, another philosophy!
1.2.2. One finds another important example of Tarski’s specific kind of
conceptual analysis in his treatment of the concept of definability. In his
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seminal paper of 1931, he declared that “the meaning of this notion is not
at all precise: a given object may or may not be definable with respect to
the deductive system in which it is studied, the rules of definition which
are adopted, and the terms that are taken as primitive”.29 Then, he de-
termined the domain within which he would make precise the meaning of
the notion, i.e., the domain of interpretation of the notion. This domain is
one of those most familiar to mathematicians, namely, real numbers. Thus,
Tarski did not address (in this paper) the general question of definability,
but the restricted question of what are definable sets of real numbers. The
construction of the meaning of the term ‘definable set of real numbers’ is
carried out in two steps. First – in the metamathematical step –, a set of real
numbers is said to be ‘definable’ if it is determined by a first-order senten-
tial function (first-order formula),30 i.e., if it is defined by what logicians
usually call an “explicit definition”. In a second step, Tarski showed how
to reconstruct this definition, within mathematics itself, by using instead
of the metamathematical notion of formulas (of a first-order language), its
mathematical analogue, namely, the concept of sets of sequences, and by
defining on these sets operations corresponding to the logical operations
adopted as primitive (negation, conjunction, disjunction, universal and ex-
istential quantification). Going further, Tarski proposed to use the concept
of a polynomial, defined as a function associating a certain real number
P.x1, x2, . . . , xn/, to every sequence x1, x2, . . . , xn of real numbers. Thus,
a set E of real numbers is definable iff there is a polynomial P such that E
is exactly the set of finite sequences x1, x2, . . . , xn satisfying the equation
P.x1, x2, . . . , xn/ D 0 or the inequality P.x1, x2, . . . , xn/ > 0. In other
terms:
EDf.x1;x2;: : : ;xn/2Rn; P .x1;x2;: : : ;xn/D0_P.x1;x2;: : : ;xn/ > 0g:
Thus, Tarski stated for the ordered field of real numbers a notion analog-
ous to that of algebraic set,31 which was well-known for the field C of
complex numbers and, more generally, for any commutative field. Tarski’s
statement is the very first definition of what modern mathematicians call
real semi-algebraic sets, as I noted elsewhere.32 Here, however, I only
want to stress that the defining process is somewhat analogous to that
which is used for the above-mentioned definition of the term ‘logical
notion’. Indeed, whenever it could be done, Tarski gave mathematical
definitions, and preferably algebraic ones, for metamathematical concepts.
He used likewise mathematical, and preferably algebraic tools, for solv-
ing metamathematical problems. For instance, he generalized Sturm’s
algorithm for counting the real roots of polynomials, by conceiving it as a
decision procedure for the elementary theory of real numbers: not only the
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number of roots, but all questions formulated in the first-order language of
the ordered field of real numbers are decided by applying Sturm’s process
in a generalized form. This result is a brilliant product of Tarski’s concep-
tual analysis, which closely tied the study of syntactic properties of the
axioms for the theory to the study of the structural properties of its model
or models.33 Tarski’s ingenious trick was to understand Sturm’s process
as a mathematical instance of the logical method of effective elimination
of quantifiers (EEQ). The older decision procedures by EEQ (Löwenheim,
Skolem, Langford, Presburger, Herbrand) were also guided by the analogy
with the successive elimination of unknowns in systems of polynomial
equations, but they did not use any theorem borrowed from the theory of
algebraic elimination. All the arguments of, say, Herbrand’s proof for the
decidability of the elementary theory of addition on integers, were of a
purely logical nature. While Herbrand, among others, tried to mimic the
algebraic elimination process, Tarski showed that the latter is a special
case of effective elimination quantifier.34 He noticed that from the point of
view of its logical structure his proof was close to the older completeness
proofs by quantifier elimination, but that it was singular in using “a much
more powerful instrument”.35 Tarski’s decision method for real algebra
and geometry was indeed the first one being of a mathematical nature.
In a historical perspective, one can say that Tarski reversed the reduc-
tion of mathematics to logic, using mathematical methods for defining
logical concepts and proving logical theorems. Developing this “reverse
logic” was nothing else, to some extent, than carrying out Hilbert’s aim
to establish a “new mathematics”. But Tarski went much further, willing
not only to construct a new logic with the help of mathematics, but also
to give an evidence for the mathematical efficiency of model-theoretical
reasoning. He restored logic to power, but on a technical as well as –
and perhaps more than – on a foundational level. He strove to extend our
possibilities of mathematical reasoning.
2. A HEURISTIC SHIFT
Solomon Feferman, who studied with Tarski at Berkeley from 1948 to
1957, confirmed that Tarski did have “a very strong motivation” not only
to make logic mathematical, but also “and at the same time to make it of
interest to mathematicians”.36
In fact, from the beginning of his career in Poland, Tarski expressed
again and again his will to make metamathematics fully mathematical. In
1936 he argued that “The methodology of the deductive sciences became a
general theory of deductive sciences, in a sense analogous to that, in which
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arithmetic is the theory of numbers and geometry is the theory of geo-
metrical figures”.37 Metamathematics, which more particularly includes
metatheories for arithmetic and geometry, became itself a science compar-
able in every respect to arithmetics or geometry, the oldest mathematical
sciences. Indeed, since metamathematical concepts can be reconstructed
by mathematical means, “they do not differ at all from other mathemat-
ical notions . . . their study remains entirely within the domain of normal
mathematical reasoning”.38 This explains how metamathematics became
able to borrow from the rest of mathematics results and methods, which
it could then apply within its proper perspective, thus yielding results that
might in turn be fruitful for what Tarski called “ordinary” or “normal”
mathematics. This is indeed the case for the definition of definable sets of
real numbers – which was a by-product of the decision method for real
algebra and geometry –, even though “ordinary” mathematicians did not
recognize the mathematical fruitfulness of this definition before the late
1970s and did not create real algebraic geometry starting from Tarski’s
work, but rather from Łojasiewicz’s semi-analytic sets.39 In one word, the
logician Tarski opened a new mathematical branch, the mere possibility of
which no mathematician could even conceive of in the thirties.
Hilbert made a strong separation between mathematics and
metamathematics, although he proposed to use mathematical tools to deal
with metamathematical problems. But solving the latter was, according to
him, eliminating them once and for all. In such a perspective, Hilbert could
not conceive of the fruitfulness of metamathematics for mathematics. In
Hilbert’s view, metamathematics was to yield a guarantee (Sicherung) for
mathematics.40 Tarski thought that this aim to provide for mathematicians
“a feeling of absolute security” was “far beyond the reach of any normal
human science”; it pertained to “a kind of theology”.41 Tarski wanted
to transform theology into mathematics. In his view, metamathematics
became similar to any mathematical discipline. Not only its concepts
and results can be mathematized, but they actually can be integrated
into mathematics. Hence they can help solve mathematical problems or
throw new light on older mathematical fields or notions, such as real
numbers, orderings, Sturm’s algorithm, polynomials, etc. – and they do so
independently of what philosophical thoughts they may involve or suggest.
Tarski destroyed the borderline between metamathematics and math-
ematics. He objected to restricting the role of metamathematics to the
foundations of mathematics. He also strove to give metamathematics a
heuristic role. He did not want to put logic to service as a tool of concep-
tual analysis; he wanted rather to develop conceptual analysis as a tool of
mathematical research. In the 1930s this was the beginning of a watershed
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in modern mathematical logic, which would become conspicuous from
the 1950s onward. While the semantic shift in logic has been and still
is the subject matter of many papers and studies,42 it seems to me that
historians of logic more rarely paid attention to the heuristic shift, even
though outstanding logicians, such as E. Beth, A. Robinson and G. Kreisel,
pointed it out.43 Now, it is Tarski who initiated this shift and, as noted by
Kreisel (1985), “the passage from the foundational aims for which various
branches of modern logic were originally developed to the discovery of
areas and problems for which logical methods are effective tools . . . did
not consist of successive refinements, a gradual evolution by adaptation
. . . , but required radical changes of direction, to be compared to evolution
by migration”.
2.1. Philosophical Attitude and Actual Doing
Tarski thought that the foundational perspective was mostly philosophical,
i.e., to some extent foreign to the technical work of logicians. Thus he was
led to a pragmatic point of view, stressing that his methods and results were
independent of philosophical assumptions concerning the foundations of
mathematics.44 Carrying Hilbert’s guideline further, Tarski sharpened the
distinction between logic and philosophy, or, more accurately, between
mathematical logic and philosophical logic. But unlike Hilbert, he abol-
ished the distinction between mathematics and metamathematics, for he
thought it irrelevant from a practical point of view.45 Now, the practical
point of view was dominant in Tarski’s actual way of doing logic.
Truly, Tarski oscillated between different stands, explicitly or implicitly
taken, on the nature of mathematical and logical knowledge and between
different opinions on his own activity. In his paper on ‘The completeness
of elementary algebra and geometry’ (1939/1967), he noted that in order
to determine whether or not a classical geometrical theorem belongs to his
elementary system “it is only the nature of the concepts, not the character
of the means of proof that matters”.46 What Tarski pointed out here is
that a first-order theory may encompass concepts expressible and provable
under non-elementary conditions which are satisfied in some particular
model of the theory. That is to say that a first-order theory may grasp
much more than first-order definable properties. From a logical (technical)
point of view, this fact is by itself significant. Now, Tarski’s insistence on
a mathematical content independent of its possible formulation or proof
might have led to a kind of realism. Although Tarski did not explicitly take
such an attitude, it is compatible with that which is expressed in the final
remarks of Tarski (1944). There, Tarski defended the intrinsic interest of
metamathematical research,47 arguing that it may be harmful to scientific
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progress to equate the importance of a work with its possible usefulness.
He added, however, that this opinion did not affect the subject matter of
his paper. The subject matter is also relatively independent of the formal
language in the framework of which it is developed and totally unaffected
by any informal philosophy associated with it.
Later on, Tarski changed his mind. Instead of stressing the independ-
ence of technical results from philosophical assumptions, he adopted the
philosophical outlook fitting his actual practice. In particular, much as an
“ordinary” mathematician, he accepted to raise the question of applicabil-
ity and to show, for example, that his theory of arithmetical classes “has
good chances to pass the test of applicability . . . [and to] be of general
interest to mathematicians”.48 At the same time, he substituted a more
pragmatic philosophy to his former “intuitionistic formalism” (borrowed
from Les´niewski).49 In the above-mentioned lecture, delivered in 1966 and
published twenty years later, Tarski related the way in which the Platonistic
approach was “so foreign and strange to [him]”.50 In Tarski’s words, the
Platonistic approach consisted in trying to catch “the proper, true meaning
of a notion, something independent of actual usage, and independent of any
normative proposals”. To some extent this view of Platonism was shared by
Les´niewski.51 But Tarski no longer agreed with Les´newski’s “intuitionistic
formalism”, proposing instead the attitude he described himself as follows:
What I shall do is make a suggestion or proposal about a possible use of the term ‘logical
notion’. This suggestion seems to me to be in agreement, if not with all prevailing usage of
the term ‘logical notion’, at least with one usage which actually is encountered in practice.
I think the term is used in several different senses and that my suggestion gives an account
of one of them.52
I think this declaration is very important for anyone who wishes to
give a positive content to Tarski’s negative statement that Lesniewski’s
philosophy did not “adequately reflect his present attitude” (footnote added
in 1956 to Tarski (1930b).53) One may already observe the presence of
such a pragmatic attitude in Tarski’s lecture at the Princeton University
Bicentennial Conference on the Problems of Mathematics, back in 1946.54
There, Tarski said that he would “use the term ‘logic’ pragmatically to
denote the work of people who regard themselves as logicians – or those
who are considered logicians by mathematicians generally”.
Now, a pragmatic attitude is, it seems to me, the most appropri-
ate one to hold in defending the practical mathematical efficiency of
metamathematics within mathematics itself.
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2.2. A Cross-Fertilization Between Mathematics and Metamathematics
If methamathematics is itself a mathematical discipline in the fullest sense
of the word ‘mathematical’, then, as Tarski stressed, “the results obtained
in one deductive discipline can be automatically extended to any other
discipline in which the given one finds an interpretation”.55 The pro-
cess of interpretation – the formal definition of which would come in
195356 – yields a fruitful co-operation between metamathematics and other
branches of mathematics. The back-and-forth method is to be applied not
only to sentences and their models, but also to different theories. The inter-
play between different areas of mathematics, metamathematics included,
brought new mathematical cross-concepts and problems, along with novel
hybrid tools to tackle them. Gödel made a significant step towards this
cross-fertilization with his coding of metamathematical sentences by nat-
ural numbers. Tarski, who often stressed that he independently discovered
the possibility of interpreting metalogical sentences about a structure S in
the structure S itself,57 systematized the use of interpreting one theory in
terms of another58 and was very eager to construct tools for “ordinary”
mathematicians from metamathematical results. Well-known successes of
the process of interpretation may be found: (1) in undecidability proofs,
and (2) in constructing algebraic translations of metamathematical notions
and theories. As an example of (1) let us mention Julia Robinson’s proof
of the undecidability of the elementary theory of rational numbers, which
was tantamount to showing the definability of integers within the field of
rationals. As an example of (2) one should be reminded of Tarski’s aim at
specifying the significance of first-order formulas by describing the clos-
ure properties of classes of models defined by them and the subsequent
use of ultrapowers – which are of algebraic nature – by J. H. Keisler (in
1964) to describe classes of models which can be defined by a first-order
formula. Last, but not least, let us mention another important example:
Tarski developed in collaboration with L. Henkin and J. D. Monk cylindric
algebras, which are an algebraic version of predicate logic.
3. CONCLUSION
One cannot say that advances in metamathematics revolutionized the
whole field of “pure” mathematics, as Gödel believed it should do.59 How-
ever, Tarski’s struggle to make metamathematics of interest to mathem-
aticians succeeded, even though not immediately. Actually, new mathem-
atical branches came out, which combine metamathematical and mathem-
atical methods, such as model-theoretic algebra, model-theoretic analysis,
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real algebraic geometry, computer algebra, etc. These branches use many
methods moulded by Tarski, and first of all tools deriving from Tarski’s
analysis of the notion of definability. Indeed, it may be the case that it
is easier to state mathematical properties of some objects by analyzing
the syntactical formula through which they can be defined rather than de-
ducing these properties by purely mathematical means. This is the case,
for instance, of proving that the projection of a semi-algebraic set is still
semi-algebraic.60 If metamathematics did not revolutionize the whole field
of “pure” mathematics, there is nevertheless no doubt that much more
of it has become an integral part of standard mathematics than “pure”
mathematicians expected.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank Elie Zaher, Liliane Beaulieu and Mohammed Melouk for
reading over my paper and improving my English.
NOTES
1 Hilbert (1918, 153–5) References are made to volume III of the Gesammelte Abhand-
lungen (referred to as Hilbert (1935)), whenever a paper was reprinted in this volume.
2 Hilbert (1922, 161).
3 Tarski (1936a), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. II, 111).
4 For example Tarski (1930a,b, 1935), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 313, 347, 639). Aj-
dukiewicz’s book on the methodology of deductive sciences (1921), which was the subject
of discussions among Polish logicians, reported Hilbert’s views: see Wolenski (1989, 162).
Tarski called Hilbert “the father of metamathematics”, “for he is the one who created
metamathematics as an independent being” (Tarski 1995, 163).
5 Tarski (1936b, Chap. VI, §36).
6 Tarski (1936b, Chap. VI, §42).
7 Ibid. p. 129 of the fourth English edition.
8 Tarski (1935–1936), First part; in Tarski (1986a, Vol. II, 27).
9 Tarski (1936b, Chap. VI, §42).
10 See for example the Introductory Note to Gödel’s 1930 paper, in Gödel (1986–1995),
Vol. I, 49–50.
11 Tarski (1930b), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 347).
12 Defined in Tarski (1936a); see Tarski (1986a, Vol. II, 101). Truth for formalized
languages is defined in terms of satisfaction.
13 See Tarski (1931), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 529), Tarski (1935), Tarski (1986a, Vol. I,
643–4).
14
‘Model’ and ‘consequence’ are defined in Tarski (1936d) (see Tarski (1986a, Vol. II,
278–9). According to Etchemendy (1988), Tarski deeply influenced our global view of
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logic by his emphasis on the concept of logical consequence over that of logical truth. In
Tarski (1936d), indeed, logical truth is defined as the limiting case of consequence. Earlier,
in Tarski (1930b), a deductive system was defined as a set of sentences which is identical
to its set of consequences.
15 Defined in Tarski (1930a): see Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 314–6).
16 Gödel (1986–1995, Vol. I, 60). For an early history of the idea – not the term – of model
in mathematics see Webb (1995) and Sinaceur (1999).
17 Skolem (1970, 464 sqq).
18 See note 13 and Tarski (1956, 416–7).
19 While mathematicians were familiar with the notion of a model for a long time, they
did not use the term very early. For example, Beltrami, Klein and Poincaré used the term
‘interpretation’. Hilbert (1899), who systematically resorted to building (algebraic) models
for testing compatibility, consistency, and independence of different sets of geometrical ax-
ioms, used the periphrase “system von Dingen, in dem sämtliche Axiome [der Geometrie]
erfüllt sind” (e.g., Chap. 2, §9).
20 Tarski (1944, paragraph 22), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. II, 692–3).
21 See Webb (1995).
22 See Vaught (1974) and Hintikka (1988).
23 Wolenski (1989, 182).
24 Carnap (1942, Preface, X).
25 In Duren (1989, 396).
26 Tarski (1930a), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 313), Tarski (1930b), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I,
349).
27 Tarski stressed it, on his own part, in an early paper published in 1928: Tarski (1986a,
Vol. IV, 55) (the underlining is mine).
28 Tarski (1986b, 145) (the underlining is mine).
29 In Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 520).
30 Tarski borrowed the expression ‘sentential function’ from the Principia Mathematica of
Russell and Whitehead.
31 Algebraic is a set whose elements are common solutions of a finite number of
polynomial equations.
32 Sinaceur (1991, 364–71).
33 In the first version of his paper (Tarski 1939/1967), Tarski considered one single model,
namely, real numbers. Later (Tarski 1948/1951, Footnote 9), he took into account Artin
and Schreier’s theory and considered the whole class of real closed fields. For details see
Sinaceur (1991).
34 More details in Sinaceur (1991, 334–9).
35 Tarski (1986a, Vol. III, 312).
36 In Duren (1989, 402).
37 Tarski (1936b), English fourth edition, p. 129 (the underlining is not mine).
38 Tarski (1931), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 520).
39 Łojasiewicz (1964).
40 Hilbert (1922, 174), Hilbert (1923, 179), Hilbert (1931, 192).
41 Tarski (1995, 160).
42 A recent study of the “Semantic revolution” and the history of the word ‘semantics’ may
be found in Wolenski (1999)
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43 See, for example, Beth (1953), Robinson (1955), Introduction; Kreisel (1954, 1958, 156;
1985).
44 Tarski (1930b), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 349).
45 Tarski (1944), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. II, 693).
46 Tarski (1939/1967), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. IV, 305–6) (the underlining is mine). The
remark is repeated in Tarski (1948/1951), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. III, 307).
47 Tarski (1944, 693–4).
48 Tarski (1952), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. III, 473).
49 Tarski (1930b), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. I, 349).
50 This is supported by another passage, in which Tarski described himself an an “extreme
anti-Platonist”, quoted by Feferman (1999, 61).
51 See Wolenski (1995, Ad (4), 337–8).
52 Tarski (1986b, 145).
53 Tarski (1956, 62).
54 Tarski (1946/2000). Jan Tarski found the draft of this talk in 1994 in his father’s
Nachlass in the Bancroft Library at Berkeley. This draft is to be published, with some
editorial work, in a next issue of The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
55 Tarski (1944), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. II, 693) (the underlining is mine).
56 Tarski (1953). Finding an interpretation of a theory T1 in a theory T2 is tantamount to
constructing in T2 a model of T1. In other words, T1 has an interpretation in T2 if, once
one has chosen the interpretation in T2 of the primitive terms of T1, one can show that the
statements obtained under this interpretation are axioms or theorems of T2.
57 Tarski (1939), in Tarski (1986a, Vol. II, 562, footnote).
58 For a historical sketch of using this method in mathematics, first implicitely, then
explicitely, see Sinaceur (1999).
59 According to Wang (1988, 168).
60 See Bochnak-Coste-Roy (1987, 23–4).
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